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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In Idaho, Pony Jackson has the right to a fair trial. The misconduct committed in
this case was not slight nor an isolated incident, but instead, cumulatively deprived
Mr. Jackson of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Jackson had
a fair trial not by submitting only competent, admissible evidence to the jury, but instead
commented that Mr. Jackson failed to present evidence of his innocence, encroached
upon the province of the jury by denying them of their right to be the ultimate judges of
the credibility of the witnesses, blatantly disregarded the district court's order prohibiting
the use of overly prejudicial evidence, and appealed to the passions and prejudices of
the jury asking that they not punish the alleged victim.
Mr. Jackson contends that the misconduct committed in his case constituted
fundamental error. He also asserts that if each instance of prosecutorial misconduct is
found to not rise to the level of fundamental error individually, aggregated the errors are
fundamental.

Further, Mr. Jackson asserts that the errors are not harmless or,

alternatively, that the errors amount to cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a
fair trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 30, 2008, a Prosecutor's Information was filed charging
Mr. Jackson with two counts of lewd conduct and two counts of penetration by foreign
object. (R., pp.7-9.) Mr. Jackson entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., pp.1314.) The case proceeded to trial.
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Prior to selecting a jury, the district court dismissed both counts of penetration by
a foreign object because the alleged incidents occurred outside of the statute of
limitations. (Tr., p.30, Ls.7-14.) The district court also took up some pre-trial business
addressing the State's concern about how to deal with why the alleged victim came
forward to report the abuse when she did:
MR. SIMPSON (Prosecutor): Okay. The other issue I've got is,
Kendra Ward, she is now 21. This happened when she was four years
old. The way this came about is, is that a couple of years ago, in 2007,
she was watching the news and Pony Jackson had been arrested for child
pornography and the news said if anyone out there has been molested by
Pony Jackson, would you please contact the law enforcement. I mean,
that's kind of my paraphrasing of it.
And so my question is, is I'm sure Todd [defense counsel] is going
to object if that - to that kind of information coming in; and I just - I want to
know the boundaries of this. Again, I don't want any mistrials or
appealable issues. Do you want me to avoid that issue unless Todd
raises it? I mean, I think I can get - I think I can say, "Did you contact law
enforcement and for what reason did you contact law enforcement,"
without getting into the THE COURT: Right. If you can, I mean, that's going to be much
better. It's going to be problematic if she's - if this evidence of charges for
child pornography come in because that can be unfairly prejudicial. I
mean, certainly she can testify that she became aware that he was
involved. WellMR. SIMPSON: Yeah. I mean, how do we - how does the jury
understand that all of a sudden she - because I think part of Todd's
defense is that why wait all this time and then all of a sudden you do it. So
how do 1THE COURT: Well, she can testify - and this may take some
coaching on your part so we don't get into a problem - but that she saw a
report about Pony Jackson and MR. SIMPSON: But don't mention it was on child pornography; she
saw a report?
THE COURT: Yeah, it wasn't based on child pornography issues
but that he was involved - that was - that he was involved - there was a
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law enforcement inquiry regarding Pony Jackson and that prompted her to
come forward, something general and innocuous like that. Certainly she
can talk about this was generated by a law enforcement inquiry; but if she
can stay away from the charges, we're going to be a lot better off.
MR. SIMPSON: Okay. I think I can coach her on that. I talked to
her about that yesterday too. And, of course, a lot of that depends on
what you ask her on cross-examination, what I can get into, I'm assuming,
after that. But that's the way - those are my THE COURT: So, I mean, that - the evidence of prior crimes and
prior acts can come in if the door gets opened on that. But, I mean, right
now that - you want to treat that as being unfairly prejudicial, the prejudice
doesn't outweigh the probative value. But if there's a door gets [sic]
opened, then that does come in.
(Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.36, L.1.)
After selecting a jury, the State made its opening statement. (Tr., p.133, L.1 p.137, L.11.) During its opening statement, the prosecution violated the district court's
order regarding the alleged victims reason for reporting, stating, "If I remember right,
she, when this initially happened, she told her mother as I recall; but it wasn't until 2007,
in January of 2007, when there was a report on the news that anybody who had been
molested by Pony Jackson, if they would contact the sheriff's office or law enforcement
office had wanted them to do that. ... " (Tr., p.136, Ls.1-8.)
The State presented its first witness, Detective Steven Anderson. (Tr., p.142,
Ls.1-6.)

Detective Anderson testified about his investigation regarding the alleged

sexual abuse of the victim. (Tr., p.142, L.1- p.172, L.11.) The next witness was the
alleged victim, K.W. (Tr., p.173, Ls.1-3.) K.W. testified about the alleged sexual abuse
committed by Mr. Jackson.

(Tr., p.179, Ls.15 - p.184, L.25.) The prosecution then

asked K.W. the following:
Q.

When you were older, did there come a time when you reported
this incident?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

What brought that about?

A.

My mom called me and told me that on the news they had said that
Pony Jackson had been arrested and that anybody else that had
been molested by him, to please come forward.

(Tr., p.18S, L.23 - p.186, L.S.)
The State's next witness was Ms. Brenda Ward, the alleged victim's mother.
(Tr., p.236, Ls.19-21.)

Ms. Ward testified that she was K.W.'s mother, had left her

daughter with her parents during the time the alleged crimes where to have been
committed, while she went to drug rehab, and that Mr. Jackson was living on the
property at that time.

(Tr., p.236, L.19 - p.2S4, L.2S.)

The State then rested.

(Tr., p.261, Ls.6-7.)
Defense counsel then presented its case, recalling the State's witnesses and
presenting the testimony of two other individuals who lived on the property during the
time the alleged crimes where said to have occurred. (Tr., p.261, L.10 - p.328, L.2S.)
During the State's cross-examination of Brenda Ward, who had been called by the
defense, the State asked Ms. Ward to vouch for her daughter's credibility:
Q.

Do you have any reason to disbelieve what Kendra has testified to
and what she has told you?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

And why don't you disbelieve her?

A.

I raised her. I know if she is lying. I know if she's telling the truth.
And you can see the hurt in her. And I've seen the changes in her.

(Tr., p.278, L.24 - p.279, L.S.)
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After giving the final instructions to the jury, the State presented its closing
argument. (Tr., p.339, L.9.) During the closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
... What is - what's her motive to say these things other than if it isn't
true. I mean, did she just wake up one morning and say, "Hmm, gee, I'm
going to accuse Pony Jackson of molesting me"? [sic] I mean, I don't - we
just - we don't do that. I mean, it happened. It's believable. Pony
Jackson did the things to her that she said he did. Whether she
remembers them in exact detail, whether there's a variation over the
years, it happened.

And the reason she came forward then is, when she heard the
news article - or I should say media report - that those who have
something to say about Pony Jackson molesting them ought to come
forward, she came forward. And she ought not to be held or punished
again for waiting to come forward.

There's just so many things that she has talked about that are so
credible that I believe that the only right and just verdict in this case - and
I know it's difficult for you to do, it's difficult for you to find this - but that
Pony Jackson sexually abused [K.W.] in the summer of 1992 at the home
or the ranch of Cleo and Sybil Wilding. How could you make these facts
up? I mean, how - a mirror, I mean, think about it. I mean, scissors.
What she says happened happened. And I would urge you to find
Mr. Jackson guilty of both counts.
(Tr., p.340, L.19 - p.344, L.11.)
In rebuttal argument, the State commented on Mr. Jackson's failure to present
evidence of his innocence, stating, "Did we hear any testimony that it didn't happen? I
don't recall hearing any testimony that it didn't happen. The only testimony I recall was
that it happened." (Tr., p.356, Ls.12-15.)
The case was then submitted to the jury, who returned guilty verdicts for both
counts of lewd conduct. (Tr., p.361, Ls.1-7.)
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Following the trial, Mr. Jackson filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and a
Batson Motion requesting a mistrial. (R, pp.63-64, 67-68.) Both motions were denied.
(R, pp.74-76.) Mr. Jackson was sentenced to a unified sentence of twenty years, with
ten years fixed, for each count, to be served concurrently. (R, pp.85-88.) Mr. Jackson
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of Conviction.
(Augmentation: Notice of Appeal.)
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ISSUE
Did the State violate Mr. Jackson's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?
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ARGUMENT
The State Violated Mr. Jackson' Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct

A.

Introduction
Mr. Jackson asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which

rises to the level of fundamental error because the misconduct was so egregious that
any ensuing prejudice could not have been remedied by a curative jury instruction. The
unfairness created by the prosecutor's misconduct resulted in Mr. Jackson being denied
due process of law and was in violation of his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of
the Idaho Constitution. The violations occurred when the prosecutor commented on his
failure to present evidence proving his innocence, encroached upon the province of the
jury by denying them of their right to be the ultimate judges of the credibility of the
witnesses, blatantly disregarded the district court's order prohibiting the use of overly
prejudicial evidence, and appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury asking that
they not punish the alleged victim.

Although defense counsel did not object to the

misconduct, Mr. Jackson asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to
fundamental error, were not harmless and, as such, this Court should vacate
Mr. Jackson's conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Jackson's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in

constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review.

City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2, 137 P .3d 388, 389 (2006).
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In

State v. Field, the Idaho State Supreme Court articulated the standard by which the
appellate courts review prosecutorial misconduct claims. 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d
273, 285 (2007). First, the prosecutor's actions will be reviewed to determine whether
they constitute misconduct.

Id.

When the defense objects, the prosecutorial

misconduct will be reviewed for harmless error. Id. When the defense fails to object,
prosecutorial misconduct will first be reviewed for fundamental error, then if
fundamental, the misconduct will be reviewed for harmlessness. Id.

C.

The State Violated Mr. Jackson's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing
Prosecutorial Misconduct
"[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of
'due process.'" Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state

shalL .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that,

"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
ID. CONST. art. I, §13.

Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.

State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127 P.3d 212, 221

(Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due
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process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to
result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.

Id.

The hallmark of due

process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial,
not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The
aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor
but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
The Court's inquiry is two-fold: 1) whether the conduct complained of was
improper; and, 2) if so, did it violate the defendant's right to a fair trial or can the
appellate court declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached
the same verdict and thus was harmless. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 448, 816
P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588,671 P.2d 1051
(1983); State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 594 P.2d 146 (1979)). In evaluating the second

prong of this inquiry, this Court must "determine whether the prosecutor's statements
were so egregious that the curative instruction from the judge was insufficient." State v.
Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,513,988 P.2d 1170, 1187 (1999).

1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Informing The JUry That
Mr. Jackson Had Failed To Provide The JUry Evidence Of His
Innocence And Asking Them To Infer His Guilt From Such Failure To
Present Evidence
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the
trier of fact in a criminal case." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,86,156 P.3d 583,587
(Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose
"is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." Id.
(quoting Reynolds, 120 Idaho at 450, 816 P.2d at 1007). "Both sides have traditionally
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been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom." Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,280,77 P.3d 956, 969
(2003)). However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated
and those implied. Id.
The law does not impose upon the defendant in a criminal case the burden or
duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. State v. Me dra in , 143 Idaho
329, 332, 144 P.3d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 2006). ''The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v.

United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). It is equally fundamental that the government
bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978). This

reasonable-doubt standard is strictly required by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
The Fifth Amendment guarantees U[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.... " U.S. CON ST. amend. V. In a criminal
case, a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on a defendant's invocation of
his constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of
inferring guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156
P.3d at 587. However, a prosecutor's general references to uncontradicted evidence do
not necessarily reflect on the defendant's failure to testify, where witnesses other than

the defendant could have contradicted the evidence. State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312,
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314, 143 P.3d 400, 402 (Ct. App. 2006). Even so, prosecutorial comments on the lack
of contradicting defense evidence may necessarily result in an indirect Griffin violation
depending on the number and nature of those comments. Id. at 315, 143 P.3d at 403.
Courts uniformly criticize this prosecutorial tactic due to the difficulty of determining
whether Griffin violations are constitutionally harmless. Id.
The reviewing court must decide, looking at the comments in context, including
the likely effect of any curative instruction, "whether the language used was manifestly
intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to
be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." Id. (quoting State v. Wright, 97
Idaho 229, 232, 542 P.2d 63, 66 (1975)). Although a prosecutor may not intend an
inference of guilt, "sufficiently ambiguous language indicates indirect Griffin error under
the objective portion of this test."

Id.

Courts generally hold that it is improper to

comment on the absence of evidence contradicting the State's case where the
defendant is the sole witness who would be able to contradict the evidence in question.
Id.

During rebuttal closing arguments, the Prosecutor made the following arguments:
"Did we hear any testimony that it didn't happen? I don't recall hearing any testimony
that it didn't happen. The only testimony I recall was that it happened." (Tr., p.356,
Ls.12-15.)
In the case at hand, the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to
present evidence of his innocence did more than simply refer to the state of the
evidence or the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence, but referenced
evidence that only Mr. Jackson could contradict, i.e., if he had been alone with the
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alleged victim K.W. and had engaged in inappropriate conduct with her while the two
where alone.

These remarks, amounting to a comment on his failure to testify,

suggested that Mr. Jackson's silence at trial was evidence of guilt.
Mr. Jackson's decision not to be a witness means that the prosecutor may not
profess a duty for him to testify in support of his innocence. As the Griffin Court
indicates:
The [Fifth Amendment] was framed with due regard also to those who
might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law
gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who
can safely venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent of the
charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others
and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and
offenses charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to
such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It
is not every one, however honest, who would therefore willingly be placed
on the witness stand.

Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613.
In the case at hand, the prosecutor commented directly on Mr. Jackson's failure
to present evidence of his innocence. It is a most egregious type of misconduct for a
prosecutor to infer to the jury that a defendant is guilty because he failed to produce
evidence of his innocence. The presumption of innocence is the touchstone of criminal
law. The prosecutor's comments that Mr. Jackson failed to present critical evidence of
his innocence is blatant misconduct.

These statements were clearly designed to

influence the jury to infer the guilt of Mr. Jackson from his failure to present evidence of
his innocence and, as a result, are undoubtedly misconduct which deprived him of his
right to a fair trial.
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2. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The
Province Of The JUry By Engaging In Impermissible Vouching For The
Victim, Denying The Jury Their Right To Be The Ultimate Judges Of
The Credibility Of The Witnesses
The prosecution committed misconduct in this case by engaging in vouching,
both by asking a witness to testify about the credibility of the alleged victim, and by
stating that the prosecutor believed the victim and her story during closing arguments.
"Statements by a witness as to whether another witness is telling the truth are
prohibited."

State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857, 810 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ct. App.

1991) (citing United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8 th Cir. 1986); Batangan, 71 Haw
552, 799 P.2d 48; State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986); State v.
Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 694, P.2d 1117 (1985); State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158,
305 S.E.2d 535 (1983)). Testimony from lay witnesses regarding issues of credibility is
inadmissible. See Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24,31, 878 P.2d 198,205 (Ct. App.
1994).
During the State's cross-examination of Brenda Ward, who had been called by
the defense, the State asked Ms. Ward to vouch for her daughter's credibility:
Q.

Do you have any reason to disbelieve what [K.W.] has testified to
and what she has told you?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

And why don't you disbelieve her?

A.

I raised her. I know if she is lying. I know if she's telling the truth.
And you can see the hurt in her. And I've seen the changes in her.

(Tr., p.278, L.24 - p.279, L.5.)
This type of questioning is strictly prohibited and is clearly prosecutorial
misconduct. However, this was just one piece in what became an underlying theme of
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the prosecution, that everyone believed K.W., those closest to her and the State, and so
should the jury.1 The vouching theme continued in the State's closing arguments.
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court,
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9
Idaho 35, _ , 71 P. 608, 610 (1903).

The prosecutor's duty is to see that the

defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and should avoid
presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. /d. The prosecutor must refrain
from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. /d.
In Love/ass, the prosecutor informed the jury in closing argument that Lovelass
had committed "full-fledged perjury," that Lovelass had lied on more than one occasion,
and everything he said to the jury was fabricated. Love/ass, 133 Idaho at 169, 983 P.2d
at 242. The Love/ass Court stated that in closing argument, "both the prosecutor and
defense counsel are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom," and that this includes "the right to
identify how, from the party's perspective, the evidence confirms or calls into doubt the
credibility of particular witnesses."

/d. at 168, 983 P.2d at 241 (citation omitted).

However, "it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion
regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or as to the guilt of the
defendant." /d. (citation omitted).

1 Although not claimed as misconduct, the State also elicited testimony from K.W. about
why the jury should believe her, allowing her to vouch for herself as well. (Tr., p.187,
Ls.1-6.)
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The Court of Appeals held that the comments did not constitute fundamental
error as they appeared to have fallen within the broad range of fair comment on the
evidence rather than an expression of the prosecutor's personal belief, but also
recognized that the prosecutor's comments were troubling and less than artful. Id. at
169,983 P.2d at 242. In State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,988 P.2d 1170 (1999), even
though the Idaho Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statement that Hairston was
a "murdering dog" did not constitute fundamental error, the statement was criticized as
"clearly improper." Id. at 507, 988 P .2d at 1181. The Idaho Supreme Cou rt cautioned
that, "[t]rial attorneys must avoid improper argument if the system is to work properly. If
attorneys do not recognize improper argument and persist in its use, they should not be
members of The ... Bar." Id. at 508,988 P.2d at 1182 (citing Luce v. State, 642 So.2d 4
(Fla. Ct. App. 1994)).
Here, the prosecutor's complained of comments during closing argument were
not directed toward the evidence, or inferences drawn therefrom.

Instead, the

prosecutor expressed his opinion and belief that the alleged victim, K.W., was a credible
and truthful witness.

The prosecution's statements went much further than the

permissible bounds allowed to encourage a jury to question the credibility of witnesses.
The prosecutor committed misconduct when he stated the following:
... What is - what's her motive to say these things other than if it
isn't true. I mean, did she just wake up one morning and say, "Hmm,
gee, I'm going to accuse Pony Jackson of molesting me"? [sic] I mean, I
don't - we just - we don't do that. I mean, it happened. It's believable.
Pony Jackson did the things to her that she said he did. Whether she
remembers them in exact detail, whether there's a variation over the
years, it happened.
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There's just so many things that she has talked about that are
so credible that I believe that the only right and just verdict in this case and I know it's difficult for you to do, it's difficult for you to find this - but
that Pony Jackson sexually abused [K.W.] in the summer of 1992 at the
home or the ranch of Cleo and Sybil Wilding. How could you make
these facts up? I mean, how - a mirror, I mean, think about it. I
mean, scissors. What she says happened happened. And I would
urge you to find Mr. Jackson guilty of both counts.
(Tr., p.340, L.19 - p.344, L.11 (emphasis added).)
These improper statements were not a fair comment on the evidence, nor were
they couched in such a way as to advise the jury that the statements were based upon
inferences at trial. The jury could have reasonably believed that the prosecutor was
expressing his personal opinion that K.W. was telling the truth. Mr. Jackson contends
that the statements created a fundamental error because they were calculated to
inflame the minds of jurors, and arouse passion or prejudice against him, and the jurors
may have been influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence.

3. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Violating A District Court
Order Excluding Overly Prejudicial Evidence And, In So Doing,
Appealed To The Passions And Prejudices Of The JUry
Violation of a district court order governing the presentation of evidence may
constitute misconduct. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572, 165 P.3d 273, 286 (2007).
Recently our Idaho Supreme Court stated:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to
the jury." State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). They
should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass
upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress
upon the rights of the accused." Id.
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007).
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In the case at hand, the district court addressed the State's concern about how to
deal with why the alleged victim came forward to report the abuse when she did before
the start of trial:
MR. SIMPSON (Prosecutor): Okay. The other issue I've got is,
Kendra Ward, she is now 21. This happened when she was four years
old. The way this came about is, is that a couple of years ago, in 2007,
she was watching the news and Pony Jackson had been arrested for child
pornography and the news said if anyone out there has been molested by
Pony Jackson, would you please contact the law enforcement. I mean,
that's kind of my paraphrasing of it.
And so my question is, is I'm sure Todd's [defense counsel] is
going to object if that - to that kind of information coming in; and I just - I
want to know the boundaries of this. Again, I don't want any mistrials or
appealable issues. Do you want me to avoid that issue unless Todd
raises it? I mean, I think I can get - I think I can say, "Did you contact law
enforcement and for what reason did you contact law enforcement,"
without getting into the THE COURT: Right. If you can, I mean, that's going to be much
better. It's going to be problematic if she's - if this evidence of
charges for child pornography come in because that can be unfairly
prejudicial. I mean, certainly she can testify that she became aware that
he was involved. WellMR. SIMPSON: Yeah. I mean, how do we - how does the jury
understand that all of a sudden she - because I think part of Todd's
defense is that why wait all this time and then all of a sudden you do it. So
how do 1THE COURT: Well, she can testify - and this may take some
coaching on your part so we don't get into a problem - but that she
saw a report about Pony Jackson and MR. SIMPSON: But don't mention it was on child pornography; she
saw a report?
THE COURT: Yeah, it wasn't based on child pornography
issues but that he was involved - that was - that he was involved there was a law enforcement inquiry regarding Pony Jackson and
that prompted her to come forward, something general and
innocuous like that. Certainly she can talk about this was generated
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by a law enforcement inquiry; but if she can stay away from the
charges, we're going to be a lot better off.
MR. SIMPSON: Okay. I think I can coach her on that. I talked to
her about that yesterday too. And, of course, a lot of that depends on
what you ask her on cross-examination, what I can get into, I'm assuming,
after that. But that's the way - those are my THE COURT: So, I mean, that - the evidence of prior crimes and
prior acts can come in if the door gets opened on that. But, I mean, right
now that - you want to treat that as being unfairly prejudicial, the
prejudice doesn't outweigh the probative value. But if there's a door
gets [sic] opened, then that does come in.
(Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.36, L.1 (emphasis added).)
At that time, the prosecution had been informed that any evidence about the
charges mentioned in the television report were not admissible, overly prejudicial
evidence, and that the prosecution's witnesses must be coached to avoid any mention
of the evidence. However, the prosecutor quickly disregarded the district court's order
stating the following in his opening statement:

"If I remember right, she, when this

initially happened, she told her mother as I recall; but it wasn't until 2007, in January of
2007, when there was a report on the news that anybody who had been molested
by Pony Jackson, if they would contact the sheriff's office or law enforcement office
had wanted them to do that. ... " (Tr., p.136, Ls.1-8 (emphasis added).)
The prosecution again crossed the line when it asked K.W. the following and
allowed her to present an answer clearly in violation of the order:
Q.

When you were older, did there come a time when you reported
this incident?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What brought that about?
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A.

My mom called me and told me that on the news they had said that
Pony Jackson had been arrested and that anybody else that had
been molested by him, to please come forward.

(Tr., p.185, L.23-p.186, L.5.)
Later, in closing, the prosecution again committed misconduct by stating, "And
the reason she came forward then is, when she heard the news article - or I should say
media report - that those who have something to say about Pony Jackson
molesting them ought to come forward, she came forward."

(Tr., p.341, L.22 -

p.342, L.1 (emphasis added).)
Each of the comments implied that Mr. Jackson was on the news because he
had been molesting other children.

While they did not specifically reference his

possession of child pornography charges, they referenced something arguably worse,
that he had been actively involved in molesting numerous children, the same type of
prejudicial evidence that the district court ruled was inadmissible because the prejudicial
effect was outweighed by any probative value. The district court's rule was clear and
the prosecutor's total disregard of the order is deliberate misconduct.
The prosecutor's statements and the un-coached answer from the alleged victim
resulted in an improper plea for the jury to decide his case based on its fears, passions,
and prejudices, namely that Mr. Jackson was a notorious child molester that should be
punished, not based on the evidence in the case at hand, but because of his propensity
to commit similar offenses. In United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir.
2005), the Ninth Circuit held that such pleas are wholly improper:
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order
to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future
lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the
defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or
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innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that,
convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing
social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a
burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear.
Id. at 1149 (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434,41 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). In Weatherspoon,
where the defendant was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm, portions of the prosecutor's closing argument focused on the personal comfort
and community safety which is attendant to taking armed ex-cons off the streets. Id. at
1149. The Ninth Circuit held that, "[t]hat entire line of argument ... was improper." Id.
Then, after quoting the above language from Koon and Monaghan, it observed that
since Mr. Weatherspoon's case turned solely on the question of whether he had, in fact,
been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the prosecutor's arguments
about the "potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a guilty verdict," were
"irrelevant and improper" because "[t]hey were clearly designed to encourage the jury
to enter a verdict on the basis of emotion rather than fact." Id. at 1149-1150. See also
State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 462-463 (2002) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where
the prosecutor made a closing argument statement that was "a direct and unabashed
appeal for the jury to find the defendant guilty out of sympathy for the victim and his
family").
Because the prosecutor's statements and the un-coached answer from the
alleged victim in this case, much like the prosecutor's pleas in Weatherspoon and
Payne, were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based on its
emotion, rather than the facts of the case, they were irrelevant and improper and their
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admission violated Mr. Jackson's rights to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments.

4. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Appealing To The
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury
During the closing argument, the prosecutor again committed misconduct by
appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury.

Authority supporting this

proposition can be found in section 3 above which is incorporated herein by reference.
The prosecution stated, "And the reason she came forward then is, when she heard the
news article - or I should say media report - that those who have something to say
about Pony Jackson molesting them ought to come forward, she came forward. And
she ought not to be held or punished again for waiting to come forward."

(Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.2 (emphasis added).)

This comment was a direct and

unabashed appeal for the jury to find the defendant guilty out of sympathy for the victim.
Such a comment is misconduct and deprived Mr. Jackson of his right to a fair trial.

D.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Fundamental
Mr. Jackson contends that the misconduct in his case, which was not objected to,

constituted fundamental error.

He asserts that prejudice from the prosecutor's

misconduct could not have been remedied by the standard jury instructions given
(informing the jury that closing arguments are not evidence) instructing the jury to
disregard the comments, or through any potential curative instruction and, therefore, the
errors were fundamental. (Jury Instruction No. 19.)
An error is considered fundamental where the comments were so egregious or
inflammatory that any prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial
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court instructing the jury to disregard the comments. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,
280,77 P.3d 956, 939 (2003). The Idaho Court of Appeals has held:
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error when it is
calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse prejudice or passion
against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be
influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence.
State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v.
Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997)); State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho
160, 167, 983 P.2d 233, 240 (Ct. App. 1999)). Furthermore, "[t]he rationale of this rule
is that even a timely objection to such inflammatory statements would not have cured
the inherent prejudice." /d. (citing State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 69, 951 P.2d 1288,
1296 (Ct. App. 1998)).
It is well settled that a prosecutor in a criminal case "has a special
obligation to avoid 'improper suggestions, insinuations, and especially
assertions of personal knowledge.'" United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d
530, 533 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88,
55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). A prosecutor may not impart to the
jury his belief that a government witness is credible. United States v.
McKoy, 771 F .2d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir.1985). Such improper vouching
may occur in at least two ways. The prosecutor may either "place the
prestige of the government behind the witness or ... indicate that
information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony."
Roberts, 618 F.2d at 533. When the credibility of witnesses is crucial,
improper vouching is particularly likely to jeopardize the fundamental
fairness of the trial. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th
Cir.1991).
U.S. v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir, 1998).
Mr. Jackson has a fundamental right to have a jury trial. He has a fundamental
right to have the jury be the fact finder and determine his guilt or innocence based upon
the vital presumption that he is innocent until proven guilty. The prosecutor in this case
impermissibly attempted to eliminate Mr. Jackson's rights by misinforming the jury that
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he must present evidence to contradict the State's evidence, in essence forcing him to
prove his innocence. In this case, the prosecutor's actions diminished Mr. Jackson's
fundamental right to a presumption of innocence and, therefore, the misconduct was
fundamental.
Additionally, the prosecutor presented any underlying theme based upon witness
vouching for the veracity of the alleged victim K.W. The prosecutor elicited testimony
that K.W.'s mother believed her and that she knew she was telling the truth because
she could tell when her daughter was lying. In a last attempt to convince the jury, the
prosecutor in closing arguments finalized its impermissible theme and told the jury that
he found K.W.'s story believable and, therefore, the jury should too. Mr. Jackson has a
fundamental right to have the jury be the fact finder and to judge the credibility of each
witness.

The prosecutor in this case impermissibly attempted to remove the role of

judging the credibility of each witness from the jury by improperly vouching for the
witnesses.

In this case the credibility of the victim was crucial and, therefore, the

impermissible vouching was fundamental.
Further, the prosecutor blatantly disregarded the district court's order to not
mention, and to coach witnesses to avoid mention, of Mr. Jackson's alleged
involvement with child pornography. Instead, the prosecution mentioned time and again
that Mr. Jackson was on the news for child molestation and implied that the news was
reporting on other child abuse victims.

The district court specifically found that this

evidence was overly prejudicial in finding that the State should find an innocuous way to
mention that seeing a television report led K.W. to come forward.

This misconduct led

the jury to decide the case, not based upon the relevant evidence, but based upon an
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idea that Mr. Jackson had a propensity to commit lewd acts with children and that
society must be protected from him. The prosecution also requested that the jury return
a guilty verdict out of sympathy for the alleged victim. These appeals to the passions
and prejudices of the jury could not have been cured by a limiting instruction, and as
such, amount to fundamental error.
Mr. Jackson additionally asserts that if this Court finds that the instances of
misconduct do not individually amount to fundamental error, the combined misconduct
amounts to a denial of a fair trial and constitutes a fundamental error.

E.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Requires Vacation Of The Conviction
The United States Supreme Court has held that, "the touchstone of due process

analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the
culpability of the prosecutor." Smith, 455 U.S. at 219. Neither misconduct objected nor
prosecutorial misconduct constituting fundamental error, will require vacating a
conviction, unless the errors demonstrate that they were not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P .3d 1175, 1183

(2007); see also State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P .3d 273, 285 (2007).

In

determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the reviewing court determines
whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
verdict. Chapman v. California, 3 U.S. 18,24 (1967); State v. Roy, 127 Idaho 228,231,
899.2d 441, 444 (1995). "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to
find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue
in question, as revealed in the record." Yates v. Evatt, 500.S. 391,403 (1991); see also

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991). The issue is whether the jury actually
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rested its verdict on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the
inadmissible evidence.

Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. at 404-405.

"The inquiry, in other

words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508.S. 275, 279 (1993).
In the present case, this Court should find that the misconduct denied
Mr. Jackson his right to a fair trial because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury would have returned the same verdict if the misconduct had not occurred. In
reviewing the trial as a whole, the prosecutor's improper comments, constituting
misconduct, likely influenced the jury.

F.

Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error, The Accumulation Of Irregularities
During The Trial Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial
Mr. Jackson asserts that the errors which occurred throughout his trial were not

individually harmless.

However, assuming arguendo that this Court finds that they

were, the accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took place negated his right
to a fair trial and, thus, mandate reversal and a new trial. Mr. Jackson asserts that if the
Court finds that the above errors were harmless individually, the errors combined
amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of
irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due
process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629,635, 51 P.3d 443, 449 (Ct. App. 2002). In
order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more
than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when aggregated,
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denied the defendant a fair trial. Love/ass, 133 Idaho at 171,983 P.2d at 244. Errors in
the admission of evidence will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is able to say,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Chapman v.
California, 3 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Under that doctrine, even when individual errors are

deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair
trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).

However, a

finding of cumulative error must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors.
State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29,909 P.2d 637, 647 (Ct. App. 1996).

Mr. Jackson asserts that the misconduct in his trial amounted to actual errors
depriving him of a fair trial.

His arguments in support of this assertion are found in

section C, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by reference.

G.

If This Court Finds That The Error Was Harmless, It Should Nonetheless
Remand The Case In Order To Discourage Further Prosecutorial Misconduct
"Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are

fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly." Brady v. Mary/and, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In State v. Wi/banks, 95 Idaho
346, 509 P.2d 331 (1973), the Idaho Supreme Court, when reviewing a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, quoted the language of the United States Supreme Court
which found:
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
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hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.'
Id. at 353-354, 509 P.2d at 338, 339 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) (emphasis added)).
Although this Court, when determining whether there was prejudice in this case,
must focus on whether Mr. Jackson received a fair trial and not on the culpability of the
prosecutor, Mr. Jackson requests that this Court follow the urging of Justice Blackmun
in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), and discourage prosecutorial misconduct
by remanding his case for a new trial.
Twice during the past year. . . and again today -- this Court has been
faced with clearly improper prosecutorial misconduct during summations.
Each time, the Court has condemned the behavior but affirmed the
conviction. Forty years ago, Judge Jerome N. Frank, in dissent, discussed
the Second Circuit's similar approach in language we would do well to
remember today:
"This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing
government counsel for such conduct as that of the [prosecutor] here. But,
each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an
attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual
condonation of counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal
disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such
conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as
if we declared in effect, 'Government attorneys, without fear of
reversal, may say just about what they please in addressing juries,
for our rules on the subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win
verdicts as a result of "disapproved" remarks, we will not deprive them of
their victories; we will merely go through the form of expressing
displeasure. The deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such
occasions are purely ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing such
tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small
price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The practice of this court -- recalling
the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters -- breeds a
deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary" (footnote omitted).
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Darden, 477 U.S. at 205-206 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In the case
at hand, the prosecutor struck "foul blows" and deprived Mr. Jackson of his right to a fair
trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jackson respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2010.
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